

Appendix

“The Effects of Women’s Descriptive Representation on Government Behavior”

This Appendix includes the following Tables and Figures:

- Table A.1 contains the full list of country-election years included in the analysis.
- Table A.2 presents descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analysis.
- Table A.3 presents the full model results (and complements Table 1 in the main text).
- Figure A.1 illustrates predicted probabilities of pledge fulfillment for different levels of the share of women in cabinet based on the party fixed effects model.
- Table A.4 presents the full model results including so-called *status quo pledges* (which are omitted from the main analysis presented in the text).
- Table A.5 presents the full model results using an alternative coding approach for the share of women in cabinet. More specifically, for the main analysis each set of pledges is matched to the share of female ministers in the cabinet that was formed immediately after the election according to the government sequence variable in Seki and Williams (2014). For this alternative approach, I instead coded the cabinet variable to reflect the share of women in cabinet *across all governments that existed between an election and the next*.
- Table A.6 presents the full model results for an analysis that follows Thomson et al. (2017, Table 3, Model 1), by only examining pledges made by single-party governments.
- Table A.7 presents the full model results for an analysis that follows Thomson et al. (2017, Table 3, Model 2), by only examining pledges made by coalition governments.
- Table A.8 presents the full model results including both measures of descriptive representation in the model at the same time.
- Tables A.9 and A.10 provide further descriptive statistics by listing and ordering all country-election year observations that are included in the analysis by *Share of women in cabinet* (A.9) and *Share of pledges fulfilled* (A.10).
- Tables A.11-A.13 test the robustness of the overall results to the potential influence of three outliers (Sweden, the US, and the UK).
- Figure A.2 compares predicted probabilities of pledge fulfillment for different levels of the share of women in cabinet based on (i) the main model specification, and (ii) an alternative specification that also includes a squared version of the share of women in cabinet variable.

Table A.1: Country-election years included in the study

Country	Election years
Austria	1999, 2002, 2006, 2008
Bulgaria	1994, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009
Canada	1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011
Germany	2002, 2005, 2009
Ireland	1977, 1982, 1987, 1989, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2011
Italy	1996, 2001, 2006, 2008
Netherlands	1986, 1989, 1994
Portugal	1995, 2005
Spain	1989, 1993, 1996, 2000
Sweden	1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010
United Kingdom	1974, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992
USA	1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996
Total	$N_{\text{elections}}=57$

Table A.2: Descriptive statistics


	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Women's descriptive representation</i>					
Female party leader	7770	0.08	0.26	0	1
Share of women in cabinet	7770	0.22	0.12	0	0.57
<i>Outcome variable: Pledge fulfillment</i>					
Pledge Fulfillment	7770	0.56	0.50	0	1
<i>Thomson et al. covariates</i>					
Single-party minority	7770	0.19	0.40	0	1
Coalition majority	7770	0.50	0.50	0	1
Coalition minority	7770	0.12	0.33	0	1
Chief executive	7770	0.77	0.42	0	1
Relevant portfolio	7770	0.77	0.42	0	1
Ideological range	7770	0.41	0.47	0	2.04
Herfindahl index	7770	0.75	0.24	0.32	1
Presidentialism	7770	0.07	0.25	0	1
Semi-presidentialism	7770	0.03	0.17	0	1
Bicameralism	7770	0.80	0.40	0	1
Federalism	7770	0.35	0.48	0	1
EU member	7770	0.75	0.43	0	1
GDP growth	7770	2.45	2.16	-1.62	9.14
Duration in years	7770	3.71	0.94	1.17	5.13
Opposition parties with experience	7770	0.36	0.48	0	1
Opposition parties without experience	7770	0.15	0.36	0	1
Number of pledges (/10)	7770	17.74	7.19	2.40	34.30
Pre-election coalition	7770	0.13	0.34	0	1
Ideological distance to median legislator	7770	0.25	0.40	0	2.11
1980s	7770	0.13	0.33	0	1
1990s	7770	0.28	0.45	0	1
2000s	7770	0.55	0.50	0	1
Subset of pledges tested	7770	0.11	0.31	0	1

Table A.3: Women’s descriptive representation and pledge fulfillment – full results

	Outcome variable: $Pr(PledgeFulfillment = 1)$					
	Female party leader			Share of women in cabinet		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female party leader	0.52** (0.17)	0.84** (0.15)	-0.07 (0.32)			
Share of women in cabinet				2.03** (0.64)	1.89* (0.75)	3.01** (0.84)
Single-party minority	0.45* (0.19)	0.43* (0.19)	0.46* (0.19)	0.30 (0.19)	0.27 (0.19)	0.42* (0.16)
Coalition majority	-0.81** (0.25)	-0.57* (0.25)	0.20 (0.38)	-0.90** (0.24)	-0.73** (0.26)	0.04 (0.35)
Coalition minority	-0.95* (0.37)	-0.75* (0.34)	0.30 (0.45)	-1.22** (0.31)	-0.98** (0.33)	0.03 (0.31)
Chief executive	0.40** (0.13)	0.33 (0.21)	0.51 (0.25)	0.43** (0.15)	0.41* (0.20)	0.57** (0.16)
Relevant portfolio	0.28* (0.12)	0.21 (0.12)	0.14 (0.11)	0.22 (0.13)	0.17 (0.14)	0.16 (0.11)
Ideological range	0.08 (0.16)	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.12 (0.13)	0.06 (0.15)	-0.02 (0.16)	-0.09 (0.11)
Herfindahl index	-0.30 (0.48)	-0.54 (0.42)	-0.08 (0.74)	-0.24 (0.44)	-0.24 (0.42)	0.44 (0.75)
Presidentialism	-1.06** (0.39)	-1.21** (0.36)		-0.96* (0.42)	-1.04* (0.42)	
Semi-presidentialism	0.23 (0.34)	-0.15 (0.29)		0.60 (0.37)	0.43 (0.38)	
Bicameralism	0.08 (0.22)	-0.25 (0.19)		0.47 (0.25)	0.26 (0.26)	
Federalism	-0.11 (0.21)	0.14 (0.19)		-0.51* (0.24)	-0.29 (0.24)	
EU member	-0.19 (0.21)	-0.17 (0.18)	-0.03 (0.27)	-0.16 (0.20)	-0.06 (0.16)	0.21 (0.27)
GDP growth	0.11** (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)
Duration in years	0.31** (0.06)	0.28** (0.08)	0.19** (0.06)	0.27** (0.06)	0.26** (0.08)	0.18** (0.04)
Opposition parties with experience	-0.30 (0.15)	-0.28* (0.14)	-0.08 (0.18)	-0.30 (0.16)	-0.29 (0.16)	-0.09 (0.18)
Opposition parties without experience	-0.77** (0.18)	-0.60** (0.14)	-0.06 (0.22)	-0.64** (0.18)	-0.55** (0.17)	-0.04 (0.20)
Number of pledges (/10)	-0.004 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Pre-election coalition	0.62* (0.30)	0.15 (0.28)	0.38 (0.31)	0.54* (0.24)	0.31 (0.27)	1.01* (0.37)
Ideological distance to median legislator	-0.03 (0.17)	-0.12 (0.15)	-0.41 (0.28)	0.08 (0.18)	0.07 (0.19)	-0.33 (0.28)
1980s	-0.37 (0.25)	-0.22 (0.21)	-0.10 (0.28)	-0.25 (0.30)	-0.22 (0.29)	-0.07 (0.27)
1990s	-0.16 (0.27)	-0.13 (0.23)	-0.11 (0.32)	-0.22 (0.30)	-0.23 (0.28)	-0.23 (0.29)
2000s	-0.04 (0.25)	-0.06 (0.24)	0.16 (0.30)	-0.21 (0.28)	-0.26 (0.28)	-0.09 (0.31)
Subset of pledges tested	-0.16 (0.20)	-0.14 (0.17)	0.06 (0.37)	-0.47* (0.22)	-0.43 (0.22)	-0.05 (0.32)
Constant	-0.52 (0.60)	-0.75 (0.67)	-0.90 (0.72)	-0.74 (0.59)	-1.17 (0.71)	-1.86* (0.80)
Party family FEs		✓			✓	
Party FEs			✓			✓
Observations (pledges)	7,770	7,770	7,770	7,770	7,770	7,770
Observations (programs)	81	81	81	81	81	81
R ²	0.079	0.085	0.095	0.080	0.083	0.096

Note: Entries are coefficient estimates for Logit regressions of $Pr(PledgeFulfillment = 1)$ on the full set of covariates in Thomson et al. (2017) and two measures of women’s descriptive representation. Standard errors (clustered by party program) in parentheses, countries weighted equally. *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Figure A.1: Predicted probabilities of pledge fulfillment for different levels of the share of women in cabinet – party fixed effects model



Note: Plot depicts predicted probabilities of pledge fulfillment for different levels of the share of women in cabinet based on Model 6 in Table 1 and Table A.3. All continuous variables are held at their mean values, all categorical variables at their median, party is set to the German Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU). Shaded regions represent 95% confidence intervals. The rugs at the base of the figure describe the distribution of the observed levels of representation. The full model results are reported in Table A.3.

Table A.4: Women’s descriptive representation and pledge fulfillment – including *status quo pledges*

	Outcome variable: $Pr(PledgeFulfillment = 1)$					
	Female party leader			Share of women in cabinet		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female party leader	0.55** (0.17)	0.84** (0.15)	0.12 (0.26)			
Share of women in cabinet				1.81** (0.59)	1.80** (0.65)	2.31** (0.72)
Single-party minority	0.42* (0.18)	0.39* (0.18)	0.35* (0.15)	0.28 (0.19)	0.24 (0.19)	0.34* (0.14)
Coalition majority	-0.77** (0.23)	-0.55* (0.23)	0.03 (0.33)	-0.85** (0.22)	-0.70** (0.24)	-0.05 (0.30)
Coalition minority	-0.98** (0.33)	-0.78** (0.29)	0.15 (0.35)	-1.19** (0.29)	-0.98** (0.29)	0.05 (0.25)
Chief executive	0.44** (0.13)	0.33 (0.20)	0.48* (0.19)	0.48** (0.15)	0.42* (0.19)	0.56** (0.13)
Relevant portfolio	0.22 (0.11)	0.16 (0.11)	0.09 (0.10)	0.16 (0.12)	0.11 (0.12)	0.11 (0.10)
Ideological range	-0.04 (0.14)	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.20 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.14 (0.15)	-0.18 (0.09)
Herfindahl index	-0.82 (0.45)	-0.93* (0.39)	-0.02 (0.58)	-0.77 (0.40)	-0.66 (0.38)	0.42 (0.61)
Presidentialism	-0.91** (0.32)	-1.00** (0.31)		-0.82* (0.34)	-0.83* (0.36)	
Semi-presidentialism	0.34 (0.31)	-0.002 (0.28)		0.68* (0.33)	0.58 (0.34)	
Bicameralism	0.06 (0.21)	-0.25 (0.17)		0.40 (0.22)	0.24 (0.23)	
Federalism	-0.03 (0.19)	0.20 (0.16)		-0.37 (0.22)	-0.21 (0.21)	
EU member	-0.17 (0.20)	-0.11 (0.17)	0.17 (0.22)	-0.12 (0.18)	0.004 (0.16)	0.39 (0.22)
GDP growth	0.12** (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)	0.11** (0.04)	0.12** (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)	0.11** (0.04)
Duration in years	0.30** (0.06)	0.27** (0.08)	0.15** (0.05)	0.27** (0.07)	0.26** (0.08)	0.14** (0.04)
Opposition parties with experience	-0.46** (0.13)	-0.45** (0.12)	-0.28* (0.13)	-0.46** (0.15)	-0.47** (0.14)	-0.28* (0.13)
Opposition parties without experience	-0.80** (0.16)	-0.67** (0.13)	-0.07 (0.18)	-0.69** (0.16)	-0.61** (0.16)	-0.04 (0.16)
Number of pledges (/10)	0.002 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Pre-election coalition	0.49 (0.26)	0.10 (0.25)	0.35 (0.24)	0.41 (0.20)	0.26 (0.23)	0.86** (0.29)
Ideological distance to median legislator	0.004 (0.16)	-0.06 (0.13)	-0.31 (0.19)	0.12 (0.17)	0.13 (0.17)	-0.27 (0.19)
1980s	-0.33 (0.24)	-0.22 (0.20)	-0.05 (0.23)	-0.24 (0.30)	-0.24 (0.29)	-0.04 (0.21)
1990s	-0.19 (0.24)	-0.17 (0.19)	0.01 (0.23)	-0.27 (0.28)	-0.28 (0.27)	-0.13 (0.20)
2000s	-0.15 (0.24)	-0.18 (0.21)	0.26 (0.23)	-0.33 (0.28)	-0.38 (0.27)	0.03 (0.21)
Subset of pledges tested	-0.17 (0.19)	-0.16 (0.17)	0.02 (0.30)	-0.46* (0.21)	-0.44* (0.21)	0.03 (0.28)
Constant	0.06 (0.54)	-0.38 (0.65)	-0.53 (0.55)	-0.10 (0.52)	-0.76 (0.63)	-1.27* (0.61)
Party family FEs		✓			✓	
Party FEs			✓			✓
Observations (pledges)	8,578	8,578	8,578	8,578	8,578	8,578
Observations (programs)	81	81	81	81	81	81
R ²	0.072	0.077	0.086	0.072	0.074	0.087

Note: Entries are coefficient estimates for Logit regressions of $Pr(PledgeFulfillment = 1)$ (including status quo pledges) on the full set of covariates in Thomson et al. (2017) and two measures of women’s descriptive representation. Standard errors (clustered by party program) in parentheses, countries weighted equally. *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A.5: Women’s descriptive representation and pledge fulfillment – alternative cabinet coding

	Outcome variable:		
	$Pr(PledgeFulfillment = 1)$		
	Share of women in cabinet		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Share of women in cabinet (Alternative)	1.78** (0.64)	1.51* (0.75)	2.91* (1.08)
Single-party minority	0.29 (0.20)	0.25 (0.20)	0.38* (0.17)
Coalition majority	-0.88** (0.26)	-0.72* (0.28)	0.16 (0.36)
Coalition minority	-1.19** (0.32)	-0.94** (0.34)	0.16 (0.34)
Chief executive	0.44** (0.15)	0.38 (0.20)	0.47* (0.19)
Relevant portfolio	0.20 (0.14)	0.15 (0.14)	0.15 (0.11)
Ideological range	0.03 (0.16)	-0.05 (0.17)	-0.19 (0.13)
Herfindahl index	-0.19 (0.46)	-0.25 (0.45)	0.60 (0.80)
Presidentialism	-0.98* (0.42)	-1.10* (0.41)	
Semi-presidentialism	0.54 (0.37)	0.30 (0.37)	
Bicameralism	0.38 (0.24)	0.13 (0.25)	
Federalism	-0.47 (0.25)	-0.22 (0.25)	
EU member	-0.18 (0.20)	-0.09 (0.17)	0.22 (0.28)
GDP growth	0.12** (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	0.11* (0.04)
Duration in years	0.27** (0.06)	0.27** (0.09)	0.17** (0.04)
Opposition parties with experience	-0.29 (0.17)	-0.27 (0.16)	-0.12 (0.19)
Opposition parties without experience	-0.68** (0.18)	-0.58** (0.17)	-0.04 (0.21)
Number of pledges (/10)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Pre-election coalition	0.57* (0.25)	0.28 (0.27)	0.91* (0.40)
Ideological distance to median legislator	0.07 (0.17)	0.05 (0.18)	-0.34 (0.29)
1980s	-0.32 (0.31)	-0.28 (0.29)	-0.15 (0.29)
1990s	-0.26 (0.30)	-0.25 (0.28)	-0.31 (0.31)
2000s	-0.25 (0.28)	-0.28 (0.28)	-0.20 (0.32)
Subset of pledges tested	-0.41 (0.21)	-0.37 (0.21)	-0.02 (0.31)
Constant	-0.55 (0.58)	-0.85 (0.69)	-1.78 (0.87)
Party family FEs		✓	
Party FEs			✓
Observations (pledges)	7,770	7,770	7,770
Observations (programs)	81	81	81
R ²	0.079	0.082	0.096

Note: Entries are coefficient estimates for Logit regressions of $Pr(PledgeFulfillment = 1)$ on the full set of covariates in Thomson et al. (2017) and the alternative measure of the *share of women in cabinet*. Standard errors (clustered by party program) in parentheses, countries weighted equally. *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A.6: Women’s descriptive representation and pledge fulfillment – single-party governments (Thomson et al. [2017], Table 3, Model 1)

	Outcome variable: $Pr(PledgeFulfillment = 1)$					
	Female party leader			Share of women in cabinet		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female party leader	1.32** (0.33)	0.83* (0.27)	-0.49 (0.59)			
Share of women in cabinet				5.73** (0.92)	2.96* (0.99)	11.34** (2.95)
Minority governments of less than 3 years	0.19 (0.30)	-0.26 (0.23)	-0.04 (0.24)	-0.09 (0.21)	-0.26 (0.25)	-0.15 (0.12)
Minority governments of at least 3 years	-0.07 (0.22)	0.19 (0.24)	0.10 (0.34)	-0.40 (0.23)	0.20 (0.24)	0.84 (0.40)
Presidentialism	-0.81 (0.78)	-1.42* (0.50)		-0.26 (0.80)	-0.88 (0.51)	
Semi-presidentialism	-0.08 (0.66)	-0.73 (0.53)		1.64* (0.67)	0.43 (0.57)	
Bicameralism	-0.59 (0.64)	-0.34 (0.45)		1.04 (0.62)	0.42 (0.57)	
Federalism	0.01 (0.59)	0.28 (0.42)		-1.10 (0.58)	-0.37 (0.53)	
GDP growth	0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.12 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.15* (0.05)	0.14 (0.10)
Opposition parties with experience	-0.34 (0.31)	-0.12 (0.24)	0.30 (0.25)	-0.46 (0.30)	-0.25 (0.25)	0.71* (0.28)
Opposition parties without experience	-1.20** (0.26)	-0.21 (0.16)	0.83 (0.50)	-0.60* (0.23)	-0.04 (0.20)	0.90 (0.53)
Number of pledges (/10)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Ideological distance to median legislator	0.42 (0.27)	-0.07 (0.28)	-1.06 (0.46)	0.45 (0.27)	-0.22 (0.29)	-0.78 (0.54)
1980s	-0.27 (0.32)	0.36 (0.21)	0.26 (0.22)	0.07 (0.25)	0.34 (0.24)	-0.14 (0.18)
1990s	0.50 (0.42)	0.45 (0.37)	0.40 (0.40)	0.26 (0.42)	0.15 (0.37)	-0.22 (0.38)
2000s	-0.03 (0.48)	0.17 (0.38)	0.45 (0.45)	-0.55 (0.49)	-0.31 (0.40)	0.53 (0.37)
Subset of pledges tested	0.12 (0.38)	-0.30 (0.27)		-0.62 (0.33)	-0.53 (0.31)	
Constant	1.13* (0.48)	1.34* (0.44)	1.65 (1.11)	0.10 (0.46)	0.91 (0.51)	-0.78 (1.31)
Party family FEs		✓			✓	
Party FEs			✓			✓
Observations (pledges)	2,946	2,946	2,946	2,946	2,946	2,946
Observations (programs)	31	31	31	31	31	31
R ²	0.055	0.069	0.073	0.060	0.069	0.076

Note: Entries are coefficient estimates for Logit regressions of $Pr(PledgeFulfillment = 1)$ on the full set of covariates in Thomson et al. (2017) and two measures of women’s descriptive representation for single-party governments only. Standard errors (clustered by party program) in parentheses, countries weighted equally. *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A.7: Women’s descriptive representation and pledge fulfillment – coalition governments (Thomson et al. [2017], Table 3, Model 2)

	Outcome variable: $Pr(PledgeFulfillment = 1)$					
	Female party leader			Share of women in cabinet		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female party leader	0.27 (0.23)	0.86** (0.23)	-0.06 (0.30)			
Share of women in cabinet				2.48† (1.38)	3.26** (1.06)	5.20** (0.73)
Majority governments of less than three years	-0.28 (0.21)	-0.37† (0.20)	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.43 (0.26)	-0.58* (0.24)	-0.43* (0.14)
Minority governments of at least 3 years	-0.04 (0.57)	-0.56 (0.59)	-0.22 (0.65)	-0.50 (0.51)	-0.24 (0.52)	-1.46** (0.36)
Chief executive	0.29* (0.12)	-0.05 (0.16)	0.15 (0.23)	0.32* (0.15)	0.05 (0.18)	0.07 (0.13)
Relevant portfolio	0.22† (0.11)	0.16 (0.11)	0.13 (0.12)	0.18 (0.11)	0.15 (0.12)	0.19 (0.11)
Ideological range	0.23 (0.31)	0.36 (0.21)	0.03 (0.18)	0.02 (0.29)	-0.03 (0.25)	-0.20 (0.16)
Herfindahl index	-0.07 (0.46)	0.18 (0.45)	0.87 (0.52)	0.28 (0.55)	0.41 (0.49)	1.37* (0.40)
Agreement between coalition partners	0.63* (0.24)	0.60* (0.23)	0.53* (0.22)	0.63* (0.24)	0.60* (0.23)	0.52† (0.22)
Bicameralism	0.29 (0.27)	-0.06 (0.26)		0.36† (0.21)	0.13 (0.28)	
Federalism	-0.11 (0.20)	0.15 (0.21)		-0.48† (0.28)	-0.54* (0.22)	
GDP growth	0.15* (0.06)	0.13* (0.05)	0.22** (0.06)	0.20** (0.05)	0.16** (0.05)	0.34** (0.04)
Opposition parties with experience	-0.21 (0.15)	-0.16 (0.10)	-0.74** (0.16)	-0.37† (0.20)	-0.39* (0.15)	-1.07** (0.13)
Opposition parties without experience	-0.25 (0.20)	0.06 (0.18)	-0.73* (0.31)	-0.42* (0.20)	-0.21 (0.22)	-1.27** (0.20)
Number of pledges (/10)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)
Pre-election coalition	1.00† (0.53)	0.57 (0.42)		0.72 (0.43)	0.31 (0.34)	
Ideological distance to median legislator	-0.32 (0.24)	-0.53* (0.22)	-0.08 (0.19)	-0.04 (0.26)	0.11 (0.19)	0.47* (0.18)
1990s	0.32 (0.21)	0.27 (0.20)	0.45 (0.30)	0.22 (0.19)	0.22 (0.21)	0.32 (0.19)
2000s	0.75** (0.24)	0.44 (0.26)	0.80* (0.23)	0.43 (0.33)	0.35 (0.31)	0.13 (0.20)
Subset of pledges tested	0.10 (0.26)	0.05 (0.25)	-0.41 (0.44)	-0.20 (0.30)	-0.23 (0.29)	-1.29** (0.27)
Constant	-1.38* (0.60)	-2.04** (0.63)	-0.54 (0.47)	-1.66* (0.62)	-2.24** (0.57)	-1.43* (0.51)
Party family FEs		✓			✓	
Party FEs			✓			✓
Observations (pledges)	4,021	4,021	4,021	4,021	4,021	4,021
Observations (programs)	45	45	45	45	45	45
R ²	0.063	0.070	0.077	0.065	0.071	0.081

Note: Entries are coefficient estimates for Logit regressions of $Pr(PledgeFulfillment = 1)$ on the full set of covariates in Thomson et al. (2017) and two measures of women’s descriptive representation for coalition governments only. Standard errors (clustered by party program) in parentheses, countries weighted equally. †p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A.8: Women’s descriptive representation and pledge fulfillment – both measures

	Outcome variable:		
	$Pr(PledgeFulfillment = 1)$		
	Share of women in cabinet		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female party leader	0.49** (0.16)	0.80** (0.15)	-0.14 (0.33)
Share of women in cabinet	1.93** (0.64)	1.63* (0.71)	3.03** (0.84)
Single-party minority	0.38 (0.19)	0.39* (0.19)	0.44* (0.18)
Coalition majority	-0.83** (0.24)	-0.57* (0.23)	0.08 (0.37)
Coalition minority	-1.28** (0.31)	-1.00** (0.29)	0.11 (0.44)
Chief executive	0.40** (0.13)	0.37 (0.19)	0.58** (0.17)
Relevant portfolio	0.26* (0.11)	0.22 (0.11)	0.16 (0.11)
Ideological range	0.09 (0.14)	-0.03 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.11)
Herfindahl index	-0.22 (0.46)	-0.32 (0.41)	0.48 (0.78)
Presidentialism	-0.89* (0.41)	-1.03* (0.39)	
Semi-presidentialism	0.62 (0.36)	0.26 (0.34)	
Bicameralism	0.47 (0.25)	0.17 (0.24)	
Federalism	-0.51* (0.23)	-0.22 (0.22)	
EU member	-0.26 (0.19)	-0.18 (0.16)	0.24 (0.29)
GDP growth	0.13** (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)
Duration in years	0.26** (0.06)	0.26** (0.08)	0.18** (0.04)
Opposition parties with experience	-0.30 (0.15)	-0.30* (0.14)	-0.08 (0.19)
Opposition parties without experience	-0.63** (0.18)	-0.50** (0.15)	-0.03 (0.21)
Number of pledges (/10)	-0.002 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Pre-election coalition	0.62* (0.24)	0.29 (0.27)	1.04* (0.38)
Ideological distance to median legislator	-0.02 (0.18)	-0.07 (0.16)	-0.35 (0.30)
1980s	-0.21 (0.24)	-0.12 (0.21)	-0.08 (0.27)
1990s	-0.17 (0.25)	-0.16 (0.23)	-0.26 (0.31)
2000s	-0.12 (0.24)	-0.14 (0.22)	-0.11 (0.31)
Subset of pledges tested	-0.39 (0.21)	-0.33 (0.20)	0.03 (0.39)
Constant	-0.92 (0.59)	-1.55* (0.73)	-1.86* (0.81)
Party family FEs		✓	
Party FEs			✓
Observations (pledges)	7,770	7,770	7,770
Observations (programs)	81	81	81
R ²	0.082	0.087	0.096

Note: Entries are coefficient estimates for Logit regressions of $Pr(PledgeFulfillment = 1)$ on the full set of covariates in Thomson et al. (2017) and both measures of women’s descriptive representation. Standard errors (clustered by party program) in parentheses, countries weighted equally. *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A.9: Country-election years sorted by *Share of women in cabinet*

Country	Election year	Share of women in cabinet
Ireland	1977	0.00
Ireland	1982	0.02
United Kingdom	1979	0.05
Ireland	1987	0.05
USA	1980	0.05
Netherlands	1986	0.05
Ireland	1992	0.06
Italy	2001	0.06
USA	1988	0.06
Spain	1989	0.08
Ireland	1989	0.09
United Kingdom	1974	0.09
United Kingdom	1992	0.10
USA	1984	0.11
Bulgaria	1997	0.11
Portugal	1995	0.11
Spain	1993	0.12
United Kingdom	1987	0.12
United Kingdom	1983	0.13
Italy	1996	0.13
Portugal	2005	0.13
Bulgaria	2001	0.14
Ireland	1997	0.14
Netherlands	1989	0.19
USA	1992	0.19
USA	1976	0.20
Bulgaria	2005	0.20
Ireland	2007	0.20
Italy	2008	0.20
Ireland	2011	0.21
Spain	1996	0.21
Ireland	2002	0.21
Spain	2000	0.22
Italy	2006	0.22
Canada	1993	0.23
Canada	2006	0.23
Austria	1999	0.23
USA	1996	0.24
Canada	1997	0.24
Canada	2000	0.24
Bulgaria	1994	0.25
Austria	2002	0.25
Canada	2004	0.26
Canada	2008	0.26
Bulgaria	2009	0.28
Netherlands	1994	0.29
Canada	2011	0.31
Germany	2009	0.32
Germany	2005	0.35
Sweden	2002	0.39
Austria	2008	0.41
Germany	2002	0.43
Austria	2006	0.44
Sweden	2006	0.46
Sweden	1994	0.48
Sweden	1998	0.48
Sweden	2010	0.57

Table A.10: Country-election years sorted by *Pledge fulfillment*

Country	Election year	Share of pledges fulfilled
Austria	1999	0.28
Ireland	2007	0.29
Netherlands	1986	0.32
Bulgaria	1994	0.36
Italy	1996	0.36
Italy	2008	0.37
Austria	2006	0.39
USA	1996	0.41
Ireland	1992	0.42
Netherlands	1989	0.43
Bulgaria	2009	0.44
Ireland	1982	0.45
USA	1984	0.47
Austria	2008	0.47
Austria	2002	0.48
Italy	2006	0.50
Germany	2002	0.51
Canada	1993	0.52
Netherlands	1994	0.52
USA	1988	0.54
Bulgaria	2005	0.54
Germany	2009	0.55
USA	1976	0.55
USA	1980	0.56
Bulgaria	2001	0.56
Ireland	1977	0.57
Ireland	2011	0.57
Ireland	1989	0.59
Italy	2001	0.60
Ireland	1987	0.60
Canada	2008	0.60
Bulgaria	1997	0.62
Germany	2005	0.62
Canada	1997	0.65
Ireland	2002	0.66
Spain	2000	0.66
Ireland	1997	0.66
Canada	2006	0.67
Sweden	2006	0.67
USA	1992	0.69
Canada	2004	0.72
Spain	1996	0.72
Portugal	2005	0.73
Spain	1989	0.74
United Kingdom	1974	0.75
Canada	2000	0.76
Spain	1993	0.77
United Kingdom	1979	0.78
Sweden	2010	0.80
Sweden	2002	0.81
Portugal	1995	0.82
Canada	2011	0.84
United Kingdom	1992	0.86
United Kingdom	1983	0.88
United Kingdom	1987	0.89
Sweden	1998	0.90
Sweden	1994	0.91

Table A.11: Women’s descriptive representation and pledge fulfillment – *without Sweden*

	Outcome variable: $Pr(PledgeFulfillment = 1)$					
	Female party leader			Share of women in cabinet		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Women’s representation	0.63** (0.16)	0.91** (0.15)	-0.05 (0.34)	1.28 (0.95)	1.07 (0.98)	2.67** (0.85)
Thomson et al. covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party family FEs		✓			✓	
Party FEs			✓			✓
Observations (pledges)	7,331	7,331	7,331	7,331	7,331	7,331
Observations (programs)	75	75	75	75	75	75
R ²	0.075	0.080	0.088	0.073	0.075	0.089

Note: Entries are coefficient estimates for Logit regressions of *Pledge fulfillment* on the full set of covariates in Thomson et al. (2017) and two measures of women’s descriptive representation. Standard errors (clustered by party program) in parentheses, countries weighted equally. All observations from Sweden are excluded. *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A.12: Women’s descriptive representation and pledge fulfillment – *without the US*

	Outcome variable: $Pr(PledgeFulfillment = 1)$					
	Female party leader			Share of women in cabinet		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Women’s representation	0.50** (0.16)	0.86** (0.14)	0.29 (0.24)	2.26** (0.68)	2.28** (0.73)	4.52** (0.56)
Thomson et al. covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party family FEs		✓			✓	
Party FEs			✓			✓
Observations (pledges)	7,230	7,230	7,230	7,230	7,230	7,230
Observations (programs)	75	75	75	75	75	75
R ²	0.090	0.096	0.106	0.091	0.094	0.108


Note: Entries are coefficient estimates for Logit regressions of *Pledge fulfillment* on the full set of covariates in Thomson et al. (2017) and two measures of women’s descriptive representation. Standard errors (clustered by party program) in parentheses, countries weighted equally. All observations from the US are excluded. *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A.13: Women’s descriptive representation and pledge fulfillment – *without the UK*

	Outcome variable: $Pr(PledgeFulfillment = 1)$					
	Female party leader			Share of women in cabinet		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Women’s representation	0.14 (0.20)	0.59** (0.21)	0.18 (0.35)	1.50* (0.71)	1.45 (0.84)	2.78** (0.93)
Thomson et al. covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party family FEs		✓			✓	
Party FEs			✓			✓
Observations (pledges)	7,290	7,290	7,290	7,290	7,290	7,290
Observations (programs)	76	76	76	76	76	76
R ²	0.069	0.073	0.081	0.071	0.072	0.082

Note: Entries are coefficient estimates for Logit regressions of *Pledge fulfillment* on the full set of covariates in Thomson et al. (2017) and two measures of women’s descriptive representation. Standard errors (clustered by party program) in parentheses, countries weighted equally. All observations from the UK are excluded. *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Figure A.2: Predicted probabilities of pledge fulfillment for different levels of (a) gender of party leader and (b) share of women in cabinet



Note: Plots depict predicted probabilities of pledge fulfillment for different levels of *Women in Cabinet*. Plot (a) only includes the variable on its own, whereas plot (b) also includes a squared term to allow for “non-linear” effects (given the nature of Logit models, the term “linear” is relative here). Each plot shows the predicted probabilities for (i) the model without fixed effects (solid line, on top in both panels), (ii) the model with party family fixed effects (dashed line, in the middle in both panels), and (iii) the model with party fixed effects (dotted lined, at the bottom in both panels). All continuous variables are held at their mean values, all categorical variables at their median, party family is set to Social Democratic, and party is set to the German Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) respectively. The rugs at the base of each figure describe the distribution of the respective type of representation.

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