# Online Appendix for

"Are Parties Equally Responsive to Women and Men?"

This Online Appendix includes 5 parts:

- Figure A1 displays the average seat share of women in national parliaments.

- Figures A2-A4 display additional information on the mean left-right self-placements of women and men.

- Figures A5-A7 illustrate the interaction effects from Table 4 in the main text.

- Tables A1-A3 present additional information on gender gaps in income, education, and opinion leadership index scores.

- Tables A4-A20 present the results of a series of robustness checks for the findings reported in the main text.

Figure A1: Average Seat Share of Women in Parliament, 1960-2016

Note: The figure displays the average seat share of women in the national parliaments of the 12 countries that are included in the analysis.

Figure A2: Eurobarometer Left-Right Self-Placements of Women and Men by Country

Figure A3: Eurobarometer Left-Right Self-Placements of Left-Leaning Women and Men

Note: The figure displays the mean Left-Right self-placement of all left-leaning women (men) in a given country-year, where left-leaning women (men) are identified as those who place themselves to the left of the overall mean Left-Right self-placement of all women (men) in a given country-year.

Figure A4: Eurobarometer Left-Right Self-Placements of Right-Leaning Women and Men


Note: The figure displays the mean Left-Right self-placement of all right-leaning women (men) in a given country-year, where right-leaning women (men) are identified as those who place themselves to the right of the overall mean Left-Right self-placement of all women (men) in a given country-year.

Figure A5: Marginal Effect of Left-Right Self-Placement Shifts on Party Shifts I

Women

Men

Female Seat Share in Parliament

Female Seat Share in Parliament

Note: The figure illustrates the findings from Table 4 in the main text. Based on the models reported in Column 2 and Column 4, it plots the marginal effect of shifts in the average Left-Right self-placements of women and men between two elections on party shifts across different levels of female seat share in parliament. The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals and the rug at the bottom illustrates the distribution of observations along the different values of female seat share.

Figure A6: Marginal Effect of Left-Right Self-Placement Shifts on Party Shifts II

Note: The figure illustrates the findings from Table 4 in the main text using the binning method proposed by Hainmueller et al. (2016). Based on the models reported in Column 2 and Column 4, it plots the marginal effect of shifts in the average Left-Right self-placements of women and men between two elections (PO Shift) on party shifts across different levels of female seat share in parliament. The rug at the bottom illustrates the distribution of observations along the different values of female seat share.

Figure A7: Marginal Effect of Left-Right Self-Placement Shifts on Party Shifts III

Note: The figure illustrates the findings from Table 4 in the main text using the kernel method proposed by Hainmueller et al. (2016) with 2000 bootstrap iterations to calculate the standard errors. Based on the models reported in Column 2 and Column 4, it plots the marginal effect of shifts in the average Left-Right self-placements of women and men between two elections (PO Shift) on party shifts across different levels of female seat share in parliament. The rug at the bottom illustrates the distribution of observations along the different values of female seat share.

Table A1: Eurobarometer respondents' levels of income, 1973-2004

Country	1973 W	1973 M	1980 W	1980 M	1990 W	1990 M	2000 W	2000 M	2003-2004 W	2003-2004 M
Austria							**6.26**	**6.62**	**6.23**	**6.83**
Denmark	**3.63**	**4.05**	**3.48**	**3.79**	**6.35**	**7.18**	**6.77**	**7.52**	**6.91**	**7.53**
Finland							4.44	5.12	4.71	5.32
France	2.97	2.99	6.68	6.72	**7.37**	**7.82**	**7.32**	**7.72**	**6.83**	**7.15**
Greece			4.47	4.52	**4.48**	**5.11**	**5.31**	**5.68**	**5.07**	**5.51**
Italy	**2.12**	**2.22**	**6.22**	**6.53**	**3.66**	**4.06**	**7.17**	**7.61**	**7.41**	**8.03**
Luxembourg	**3.09**	**3.76**	7.15	7.54	7.98	8.11	6.56	6.92	**7.68**	**8.04**
Netherlands	3.37	3.20	**7.42**	**7.96**	**6.94**	**7.68**	**7.32**	**8.14**	**6.34**	**7.02**
Portugal					**7.98**	**8.54**	**3.61**	**4.09**	**3.65**	**4.10**
Spain					**3.67**	**4.18**	**8.40**	**9.29**	**9.34**	**9.80**
Sweden							**5.03**	**5.67**	**5.81**	**6.34**
UK	**2.47**	**2.79**	**6.58**	**7.31**	**7.52**	**8.58**	**7.77**	**8.22**	**7.08**	**7.69**
Average	2.94	3.17	6.00	6.34	6.22	6.81	6.33	6.88	6.42	6.95

Note: The measure is based on the Eurobarometer variable `INCOME`, which asks for the financial situation of the respondent. The variable is coded in a country specific way. After presenting the respondents with an "income card" that displays an income scale with different groups, respondents are asked to place themselves into their respective group. The table presents mean values for women (W) and men (M) in a given country and year. The Eurobarometer stopped asking income questions after Eurobarometer 61 (Feb-Mar 2004). Therefore, the last column combines the last available data for 2003 and 2004. Country-year pairs in **bold** indicate significant differences at the 95% confidence level (two-sided t-tests).

Table A2: Eurobarometer respondents' levels of education, 1973-2010

Country	1973 W	1973 M	1980 W	1980 M	1990 W	1990 M	2000 W	2000 M	2010 W	2010 M
Austria							**4.56**	**4.98**	**4.70**	**4.85**
Denmark	**3.19**	**3.80**	3.46	3.65	**6.30**	**7.05**	7.42	7.32	7.73	7.71
Finland							6.45	6.25	**6.80**	**6.54**
France	**3.56**	**3.85**	4.10	4.21	4.79	4.97	5.50	5.42	5.51	5.49
Greece			**2.98**	**3.93**	**3.80**	**4.92**	**4.36**	**4.66**	**4.99**	**5.46**
Italy	**2.62**	**3.34**	**2.90**	**3.89**	**3.99**	**4.95**	**4.88**	**5.39**	**4.85**	**5.14**
Luxembourg	**3.69**	**4.93**	**3.37**	**4.15**	**4.73**	**5.67**	**5.25**	**5.73**	**5.95**	**6.21**
Netherlands	**3.41**	**5.16**	**3.81**	**5.34**	**4.81**	**6.07**	**5.23**	**5.79**	**6.59**	**6.92**
Portugal					3.28	3.49	**2.84**	**3.52**	**3.12**	**3.31**
Spain					**3.77**	**4.45**	**4.10**	**4.65**	**4.23**	**4.46**
Sweden							6.39	6.24	**7.20**	**6.78**
UK	**2.52**	**2.94**	**3.06**	**3.32**	**3.63**	**3.90**	3.88	3.95	4.60	4.60
Average	3.17	4.00	3.38	4.07	4.34	5.05	5.07	5.33	5.52	5.62

Note: The measure is based on the Eurobarometer variable `EDUC`, which measures how old a respondent was when they finished their full-time education. It ranges from "up to 14 years" (1), over "22 years or older" (9) to "still studying" (10). The table presents mean values for women (W) and men (M) in a given country and year. Country-year pairs in **bold** indicate significant differences at the 95% confidence level (two-sided t-tests).

Table A3: Eurobarometer respondents' opinion leadership index, 1973-2010

	1973		1980		1990		2000		2010	
Country	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M
Austria							**2.34**	**2.66**	**2.30**	**2.63**
Denmark	**2.31**	**2.73**	**2.13**	**2.49**	**2.47**	**2.67**	**2.48**	**2.65**	**2.66**	**2.77**
Finland							**2.24**	**2.42**	**2.24**	**2.37**
France	**1.99**	**2.39**	**2.04**	**2.25**	**2.26**	**2.43**	**2.05**	**2.28**	**2.24**	**2.50**
Greece			**2.16**	**2.67**	**2.79**	**3.11**	**2.40**	**2.78**	**2.57**	**3.04**
Italy	**2.02**	**2.66**	**2.01**	**2.61**	**2.26**	**2.66**	**2.35**	**2.66**	**2.25**	**2.49**
Luxembourg	**2.30**	**3.08**	**2.33**	**2.66**	**2.41**	**2.78**	**2.31**	**2.60**	**2.48**	**2.62**
Netherlands	**2.19**	**2.47**	**2.49**	**2.67**	**2.58**	**2.73**	**2.45**	**2.66**	**2.98**	**3.13**
Portugal					**1.83**	**2.17**	**1.96**	**2.36**	**2.04**	**2.35**
Spain					**1.92**	**2.23**	**2.01**	**2.28**	**1.97**	**2.19**
Sweden							**2.29**	**2.49**	2.59	2.61
UK	**1.94**	**2.38**	**2.11**	**2.44**	**2.21**	**2.42**	**1.94**	**2.17**	**2.18**	**2.37**
Average	2.12	2.62	2.18	2.54	2.30	2.58	2.23	2.50	2.38	2.59

Note: The opinion leadership index is based on the Eurobarometer variables POLDISC and PERSUADE, which measure how often respondents discuss politics, and how often they try to persuade friends of their views. The index ranges from "very low" (1) to "very high" (4). For more information on the index see Schmitt et al. (2008). The table presents mean values for women (W) and men (M) in a given country and year. Country-year pairs in **bold** indicate significant differences at the 95% confidence level (two-sided t-tests).

Table A4: Parties' responsiveness to different electorates using rescaled Manifesto data

	Outcome variable: Change in Party Position			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Voter shift (All)	0.40** (0.15)			
Voter shift (Women)		0.26* (0.14)		−0.27 (0.24)
Voter shift (Men)			0.48*** (0.15)	0.73*** (0.27)
Party shift (t-1)	−0.29*** (0.05)	−0.29*** (0.05)	−0.29*** (0.05)	−0.29*** (0.05)
Constant	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.04)
Observations	356	356	356	356
R^2	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.13

Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from an OLS regression and robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is the change in a party's rescaled Left-Right position (Lowe et al. 2011) between the current election and the previous election. The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in the text. $^*p$ <0.10, $^{**}p$ <0.05, $^{***}p$ <0.01, two-tailed test.

Table A5: Party responsiveness at different levels of female seat share using rescaled Manifesto data

	Outcome variable: Change in Party Position			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Women		**Men**	
Voter shift	0.59*	0.75**	0.66**	0.75***
	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Female seat share	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Voter shift	**−0.01**	**−0.02**	**−0.01**	**−0.01**
× Female seat share	**(0.01)**	**(0.01)**	**(0.01)**	**(0.01)**
Party shift	−0.31***	−0.32***	−0.31***	−0.31***
(t-1)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Vote change		0.01		0.01
(t-1)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Party shift (t-1)		0.001		−0.0002
× Vote change (t-1)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Constant	0.17**	0.15*	0.13*	0.10
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Observations	356	344	356	344
R^2	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.15

Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from an OLS regression and robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is the change in a party's rescaled Left-Right position (Lowe et al. 2011) between the current election and the previous election. The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in the text. $^*p <0.10$, $^{**}p <0.05$, $^{***}p <0.01$, two-tailed test.

Table A6: Party responsiveness at different levels of female seat share using lagged female seat share data

	Outcome variable: Change in Party Position			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Women		**Men**	
Voter shift	0.69**	0.73**	0.76**	0.80**
	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.31)
Female seat share	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***
(lagged)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Voter shift	**−0.02**	**−0.02**	**−0.01**	**−0.02**
× Female seat share (lagged)	**(0.01)**	**(0.01)**	**(0.01)**	**(0.01)**
Party shift	−0.36***	−0.36***	−0.36***	−0.35***
(t-1)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Vote change		0.01		0.01
(t-1)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Party shift (t-1)		−0.01		−0.01
× Vote change (t-1)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Constant	0.21**	0.21**	0.17**	0.17**
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Observations	351	351	351	351
R^2	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16

Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from an OLS regression and robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is the change in a party's Left-Right position between the current election and the previous election. Female seat share indicates the female seat share in parliament at the end of the calendar year previous to a given election. The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in the text. $^*p <0.10$, $^{**}p <0.05$, $^{***}p <0.01$, two-tailed test.

Table A7: Party responsiveness at different levels of female seat share (party-level)

	Outcome variable: Change in Party Position			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Women		**Men**	
Voter shift	1.35**	1.38**	1.85***	1.78***
	(0.67)	(0.65)	(0.60)	(0.58)
Female seat share	−0.01*	−0.01*	−0.01	−0.01*
(party-level)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Voter shift	**−0.03**	**−0.03**	**−0.04***	**−0.03***
× Female seat share	**(0.02)**	**(0.02)**	**(0.02)**	**(0.02)**
(party-level)				
Party shift	−0.30***	−0.30***	−0.30***	−0.30***
(t-1)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Vote change		−0.003		−0.003
(t-1)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Party shift (t-1)		0.02		0.01
× Vote change (t-1)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Constant	0.13	0.16	0.10	0.12
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Observations	210	210	210	210
R^2	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.15

Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from an OLS regression and robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is the change in a party's Left-Right position between the current election and the previous election. Female seat share is measured at the party-level using the data in Greene and O'Brien (2016). The definitions of the other explanatory variables are given in the text. The negative coefficient estimates for the interaction effect in Columns 3 and 4 suggest that parties become less responsive to preference shifts among men as the female seat share at the party-level increases. This effect is significantly different from a null effect at the 90% confidence level. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$, two-tailed test.

Table A8: Leftist parties' responsiveness to different electorates

	Outcome variable: Change in Party Position			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Voter shift (All)	0.33 (0.28)			
Voter shift (Women)		0.21 (0.25)		−0.29 (0.44)
Voter shift (Men)			0.39 (0.29)	0.65 (0.51)
Party shift (t-1)	−0.31*** (0.10)	−0.31*** (0.10)	−0.31*** (0.10)	−0.32*** (0.10)
Constant	0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	−0.0001 (0.07)
Observations	114	114	114	114
R^2	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.13

Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from an OLS regression and robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is the change in a party's Left-Right position between the current election and the previous election for leftist parties only. A party is defined as leftist if the Manifesto data classifies it as belonging to the Social Democratic party family. The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in the text. *p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01, two-tailed test.

Table A9: Leftist parties' responsiveness at different levels of female seat share

	Outcome variable: Change in Party Position			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Women		**Men**	
Voter shift	0.06	0.18	0.16	0.32
	(0.47)	(0.42)	(0.55)	(0.46)
Female seat share	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Voter shift	**0.01**	**0.003**	**0.01**	**0.01**
× Female seat share	**(0.02)**	**(0.02)**	**(0.02)**	**(0.02)**
Party shift	−0.32***	−0.32***	−0.33***	−0.32***
(t-1)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Vote change		0.003		0.004
(t-1)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Party shift (t-1)		−0.01		−0.01
× Vote shift (t-1)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Constant	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.14
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Observations	114	114	114	114
R^2	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.15

Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from an OLS regression and robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is the change in a party's Left-Right position between the current election and the previous election for leftist parties only. A party is defined as leftist if the Manifesto data classifies it as belonging to the Social Democratic party family. The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in the text. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$, two-tailed test.

Table A10: Rightist parties' responsiveness to different electorates

	Outcome variable: Change in Party Position			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Voter shift (All)	0.43 (0.37)			
Voter shift (Women)		0.23 (0.35)		−0.68 (0.51)
Voter shift (Men)			0.58* (0.34)	1.17** (0.51)
Party shift (t-1)	−0.39*** (0.12)	−0.40*** (0.12)	−0.39*** (0.12)	−0.39*** (0.12)
Constant	−0.10 (0.07)	−0.10 (0.07)	−0.12* (0.07)	−0.15** (0.07)
Observations	115	115	115	115
R^2	0.15	0.14	0.16	0.17

Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from an OLS regression and robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is the change in a party's Left-Right position between the current election and the previous election for rightist parties only. A party is defined as rightist if the Manifesto data classifies it as belonging to the Christian Democratic or Conservative party family. The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in the text. *p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01, two-tailed test.

Table A11: Rightist parties' responsiveness at different levels of female seat share

| | Outcome variable: Change in Party Position | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
	Women		**Men**	
Voter shift	1.13*	1.03	1.26**	1.14**
	(0.64)	(0.64)	(0.52)	(0.48)
Female seat share	−0.01	−0.01	−0.003	−0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Voter shift	**−0.04**	**−0.04**	**−0.04**	**−0.03**
× Female seat share	**(0.03)**	**(0.03)**	**(0.02)**	**(0.02)**
Party shift	−0.41***	−0.39***	−0.40***	−0.37***
(t-1)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Vote change		0.02		0.02
(t-1)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Party shift (t-1)		−0.02		−0.02
× Vote change (t-1)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Constant	0.02	0.06	−0.06	−0.01
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Observations	115	115	115	115
R^2	0.16	0.19	0.18	0.20

Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from an OLS regression and robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is the change in a party's Left-Right position between the current election and the previous election for rightist parties only. A party is defined as rightist if the Manifesto data classifies it as belonging to the Christian Democratic or Conservative party family. The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in the text. *p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01, two-tailed test.

Table A12: Parties' responsiveness to different electorates under low female seat shares

	Outcome variable: Change in Party Position			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Voter shift (All)	0.47** (0.23)			
Voter shift (Women)		0.34* (0.20)		−0.06 (0.30)
Voter shift (Men)			0.51** (0.23)	0.56 (0.35)
Party shift (t-1)	−0.39*** (0.07)	−0.38*** (0.07)	−0.39*** (0.07)	−0.39*** (0.07)
Constant	0.10** (0.05)	0.11** (0.05)	0.09* (0.05)	0.09 (0.06)
Observations	173	173	173	173
R^2	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.18

Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from an OLS regression and robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is the change in a party's Left-Right position between the current election and the previous election. The analysis includes only observations with a below-median female seat share in parliament (26.3%). The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in the text. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$, two-tailed test.

Table A13: Parties' responsiveness to different electorates under high female seat shares

	Outcome variable: Change in Party Position			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Voter shift (All)	0.27 (0.27)			
Voter shift (Women)		0.16 (0.26)		−0.70 (0.57)
Voter shift (Men)			0.38 (0.28)	1.08* (0.63)
Party shift (t-1)	−0.34*** (0.09)	−0.34*** (0.09)	−0.33*** (0.09)	−0.34*** (0.09)
Constant	−0.17*** (0.05)	−0.17*** (0.05)	−0.18*** (0.05)	−0.21*** (0.06)
Observations	178	178	178	178
R^2	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.13

Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from an OLS regression and robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is the change in a party's Left-Right position between the current election and the previous election. The analysis includes only observations with an at least median female seat share in parliament (26.3%). The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in the text. *p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01, two-tailed test.

Table A14: Parties' responsiveness to different electorates at varying income levels

	Outcome variable: Change in Party Position				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	High income	Low income	High income	Low income	High income
Voter shift	0.36**	0.29*			0.11
(Women)	(0.16)	(0.16)			(0.16)
Voter shift			0.64***	0.48***	0.57**
(Men)			(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.23)
Party shift	−0.34***	−0.34***	−0.33***	−0.34***	−0.33***
(t-1)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Constant	0.004	0.01	−0.02	−0.004	−0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Observations	258	258	258	258	258
R^2	0.14	0.13	0.16	0.15	0.16

Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from an OLS regression and robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is the change in a party's Left-Right position between the current election and the previous election. The high income columns refer to preference shifts among respondents with above-median income, low income refers to respondents with median or below-median income. The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in the text. $^*p$ <0.10, $^{**}p$ <0.05, $^{***}p$ <0.01, two-tailed test.

Table A15: Parties' responsiveness to different electorates at varying levels of education

| | Outcome variable: Change in Party Position | | | | |
	(1) High education	(2) Low education	(3) High education	(4) Low education	(5) High education
Voter shift (Women)	0.37** (0.15)	0.16 (0.15)			0.22 (0.16)
Voter shift (Men)			0.40*** (0.15)	0.42*** (0.16)	0.29* (0.17)
Party shift (t-1)	−0.32*** (0.06)	−0.33*** (0.06)	−0.34*** (0.06)	−0.32*** (0.06)	−0.33*** (0.06)
Constant	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.06 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.04)
Observations	347	347	347	347	347
R^2	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.13

Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from an OLS regression and robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is the change in a party's Left-Right position between the current election and the previous election. The high education columns refer to preference shifts among respondents with above-median education, low education refers to respondents with median or below-median education. The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in the text. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$, two-tailed test.

Table A16: Parties' responsiveness to different electorates including time controls

| | Outcome variable: Change in Party Position | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Voter shift (All)	0.34* (0.17)			
Voter shift (Women)		0.23 (0.16)		−0.21 (0.29)
Voter shift (Men)			0.41** (0.18)	0.60* (0.32)
Party shift (t-1)	−0.35*** (0.06)	−0.35*** (0.06)	−0.35*** (0.06)	−0.36*** (0.06)
1980s	−0.59** (0.28)	−0.61** (0.28)	−0.59** (0.27)	−0.60** (0.28)
1990s	−0.67** (0.28)	−0.70** (0.28)	−0.65** (0.28)	−0.66** (0.28)
2000s	−0.81*** (0.27)	−0.84*** (0.27)	−0.80*** (0.27)	−0.81*** (0.27)
Constant	0.66** (0.26)	0.69*** (0.26)	0.64** (0.27)	0.63** (0.27)
Observations	351	351	351	351
R^2	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16

Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from an OLS regression and robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is the change in a party's Left-Right position between the current election and the previous election. The models include dummy variables for the years 1973-1979 (excluded as baseline), 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2012. The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in the text. *p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01, two-tailed test.

Table A17: Parties' responsiveness to different electorates including time trends

	Outcome variable: Change in Party Position			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Voter shift (All)	0.39** (0.17)			
Voter shift (Women)		0.28* (0.16)		−0.21 (0.28)
Voter shift (Men)			0.46*** (0.17)	0.66** (0.31)
Party shift (t-1)	−0.35*** (0.06)	−0.35*** (0.06)	−0.35*** (0.06)	−0.35*** (0.06)
Time trend	−0.01** (0.004)	−0.01*** (0.004)	−0.01** (0.004)	−0.01** (0.004)
Constant	0.22** (0.11)	0.23** (0.11)	0.20* (0.11)	0.19 (0.12)
Observations	351	351	351	351
R^2	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.15

Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from an OLS regression and robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is the change in a party's Left-Right position between the current election and the previous election. The models include a *Time trend* variable with values ranging from 1 for the first observed year in the data set (1973) to 40 for the last observed year (2012). The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in the text. $^*p$ <0.10, $^{**}p$ <0.05, $^{***}p$ <0.01, two-tailed test.

Table A18: Parties' responsiveness to different electorates including time interactions

	Outcome variable: Change in Party Position			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Voter shift (All)	0.82*** (0.21)			
Voter shift (Women)		0.68*** (0.20)		0.22 (0.35)
Voter shift (Men)			0.80*** (0.21)	0.61 (0.38)
Party shift (t-1)	−0.33*** (0.06)	−0.33*** (0.06)	−0.33*** (0.06)	−0.33*** (0.06)
Post-1993	−0.11 (0.08)	−0.13* (0.08)	−0.08 (0.08)	−0.12 (0.08)
All shift × Post-1993	−0.87*** (0.32)			
Women shift × Post-1993		−0.81*** (0.29)		−0.96* (0.57)
Men shift × Post-1993			−0.74** (0.34)	0.21 (0.68)
Constant	0.02 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	−0.001 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)
Observations	351	351	351	351
R^2	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.15

Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from an OLS regression and robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is the change in a party's Left-Right position between the current election and the previous election. The models include an interaction between the dummy variable *Post-1993* (1 for years after 1993, 0 otherwise) and the respective public opinion shifts. The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in the text. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$, two-tailed test.

Table A19: Robustness checks for preference shifts among women

	Outcome variable: Change in Party Position			
	(1) Policy Moderation	(2) Niche Parties	(3) Party Fixed Effects	(4) Country Fixed Effects
Voter shift	0.78**	0.60*	0.63*	0.65*
	(0.34)	(0.31)	(0.38)	(0.35)
Female seat share	−0.01***	−0.01**	0.003	0.0000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Voter shift × Female seat share	**−0.02**	**−0.01**	**−0.02**	**−0.02**
	(0.01)	**(0.01)**	**(0.01)**	**(0.01)**
Party shift (t-1)	−0.36***	−0.35***	−0.42***	−0.39***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Vote change (t-1)	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Party shift (t-1) × Vote change (t-1)	−0.01	−0.02	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party system convergence	0.05			
	(0.05)			
Niche party		−0.06		
		(0.08)		
Voter shift × Niche party		−0.53		
		(0.35)		
Constant	0.20**	0.14*	−0.89**	−0.72**
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.39)	(0.30)
Observations	351	476	351	351
R^2	0.15	0.15	0.27	0.21

Note: Columns 1-2 report estimated coefficients from an OLS regression and robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns 3-4 report estimated coefficients from OLS regressions with party-specific (Column 3) and country-specific (Column 4) fixed effects as well as robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is the change in a party's Left-Right position between the current election and the previous election. Voter shift always refers to the change in the average Left-Right self-placement of women. The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in the text. *$p < 0.10$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$, two-tailed test.

Table A20: Robustness checks for preference shifts among men

	Outcome variable: Change in Party Position			
	(1) Policy Moderation	(2) Niche Parties	(3) Party Fixed Effects	(4) Country Fixed Effects
Voter shift	0.77** (0.33)	0.68** (0.30)	0.70* (0.37)	0.71** (0.34)
Female seat share	−0.01** (0.003)	−0.01** (0.003)	0.004 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
Voter shift × Female seat share	**−0.01** **(0.01)**	**−0.01** **(0.01)**	**−0.01** **(0.01)**	**−0.01** **(0.01)**
Party shift (t-1)	−0.35*** (0.06)	−0.35*** (0.05)	−0.42*** (0.06)	−0.39*** (0.06)
Vote change (t-1)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Party shift (t-1) × Vote change (t-1)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
Party system convergence	0.05 (0.05)			
Niche party		−0.03 (0.08)		
Voter shift × Niche party		−0.73* (0.40)		
Constant	0.15* (0.09)	0.11 (0.08)	−0.93** (0.38)	−0.76** (0.30)
Observations	351	476	351	351
R^2	0.16	0.15	0.28	0.22

Note: Columns 1-2 report estimated coefficients from an OLS regression and robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns 3-4 report estimated coefficients from OLS regressions with party-specific (Column 3) and country-specific (Column 4) fixed effects as well as robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is the change in a party's Left-Right position between the current election and the previous election. Voter shift always refers to the change in the average Left-Right self-placement of men. The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in the text. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$, two-tailed test.

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